It seems I cannot absorb any information these days without gasping, scratching my head and wondering what the hell this person could possibly be thinking.
This means either that I am going insane or that I am far ahead of the curve, which in practical terms are roughly equivalent.
On the other hand, I made a woman laugh last night. We met briefly online at a site where Tavis Smiley was making an appearance after hosting his new documentary “Stand” for a select few (I guess I’m not that well connected yet or I would have paid for my own plane ticket to attend), and it was just the two of us killing time, and she found me amusing.
I told her that she obviously did not know me well, that I am the most annoyed person I know. It’s almost impossible for me to socialize anymore, because nobody wants to talk about the things that I consider essential to talk about.
Whew.
I wrote recently (amidst no evidence that anybody noticed) that the national government headed by president Barack Obama lacks clarity in its policy making and its positions. Nowhere is that more evident than in Afghanistan. So, I eagerly followed my Twitter link (I am JerzyWalt) to the latest New Yorker article on that very subject.
Sigh.
Steve Coll writes “The miscalculations across five Administrations are by now generally understood: near-unequivocal support for anti-American militias during the nineteen-eighties; averted eyes as Pakistan pursued its covert nuclear ambitions; the abandonment of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal; the failure to recognize the menace of Al Qaeda during the nineteen-nineties; erratic investments in Pakistan’s democracy, economy, and civil society; and, most recently, a war in Afghanistan after 9/11 which did not defeat Al Qaeda or the Taliban but chased them into Pakistan, where they regrouped and have proceeded to destabilize a country now endowed with atomic bombs.”
The above is a list of things the U.S. did wrong, which implies that there are things the U.S. could have done right. Let’s examine that: we supported those who were fighting the Soviet Union; the alternative was to give up that chip? Perhaps, but does that sound like rational policy? We “averted” our “eyes” as Pakistan developed the bomb, or we welcomed it as a useful counterweight to India’s similar capability, India being more in the USSR sphere of influence and Pakistan more in the US sphere of influence? I read a lot of news in the 1980s and 1990s (and in every decade of my life, really); I recall plenty being written on this subject. It is plain ignorant to, today, describe it as some sort of clandestine, frowned-upon activity.
We failed to recognize the “menace” of al Quaeda in the 1990s? Does this guy get to just make stuff up? Clinton’s missiles may have missed, but they were aimed at al Quaeda. As I see it, 9/11 is a simple failure of airline security, spectacularly exposed. Is it now some sort of de facto principle of American foreign policy to declare al Quaeda an all-time significant threat? They’ve been more despicable than Hitler was? In any case, we knew who they were in the 1990s, and there is plenty of evidence that we had all the information we needed to pre-empt 9/11, but for an inept new president and his equally inept security team.
Our investments in Pakistan’s democracy were “erratic”? In other words, we didn’t pull hard enough on the levers of another nation’s political apparatus? And our track record when we do such things is…? (See: Iran, Philippines, most of Central America, a good chunk of South America, Haiti…you get the picture.) It is far from clear that there was anything that the U.S. could have done to help Pakistan avoid the circumstances which soak it today, except perhaps one: Not invade Afghanistan.
In other words, the point is this: the only sensible policy in that region is none at all. MYOB, and all that stuff. It’s their turf, their world, their stupid fight, let them have it. If the Afghanis do not feel like taking up arms against the Taliban, well, have we really forgotten that essential lesson of Viet Nam so soon? We cannot win a war for a country which is not itself committed to winning that war.
It’s just that plain and it’s just that simple.
Which is why, when not a speck of that sensibility was apparent as I read the New Yorker article, I got that feeling again that I’m either completely out of it, or far ahead of the curve.
And as I said, it feels like insanity either way.
Coll goes on to write: “For several months, the Obama Administration has been rethinking American policy, hoping to depart from this history of dysfunction. It has announced a formal strategy: an adaptive counterinsurgency doctrine that seeks to emphasize the security and the prosperity of the Afghan and Pakistani people above all; economic and development aid; vigorous diplomacy; and carefully targeted warfare, particularly aimed at Al Qaeda. Already, however, Obama and his advisers have had to confront the puzzle of which policies in their new portfolio will promote stability in the region, and which will promote instability.”
Yes, rethinking American policy, that’s what we need. Surely the Obama team will miraculously discover some combination of methods which has never been tried before; surely there are things we can do which will guide this fragile situation to an acceptable outcome.
Um…why? Let me put it to you in these terms: my 17 year old daughter has abysmal judgment when it comes to men. (Not really, but close enough for this analogy.) Surely there is something I can do, something I can say to fix that, so that once I’ve done those things, from that point on she will always choose wisely and the problem will be solved.
Preposterous on its face, right? I have literally no control and barely any influence when it comes to what her heart, mind and hormones tell her to do, and it would be equal parts ignorance and hubris on my part to believe otherwise.
Yet, we are supposed to believe that there is some combination of U.S. policies which will solve a centuries old dispute in a region about which we know next to nothing and within which we have close to zero influence.
The Afghanis know one thing for sure: we will eventually leave. And when we do, who will have their backs? So, what exactly is their incentive to side with a U.S. policy which will only mark them as targets upon our departure?
Would you do it?
So why should they?